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1. Introduction
Road congestion remains one of the most pressing issues in urban areas all over the world.
Although the five most congested cities are located in developing countries, recent data indicate
that they are followed by Rome, Paris and London, which all present higher values than some
large US cities1 (INRIX, 2019). In the case of Rome, for example, 166 hours are lost per driver
due to congestion per year. Evidence is growing that traffic congestion has many negative
consequences related to employment (Hymel, 2009), pollution and health (Green et al., 2020,
Simeonova et al., 2020, Requia et al., 2018) and road fatalities (Pasidis, 2019). All in all, the
current cost of road congestion in Europe is estimated to be over 270 billion euro per year (about
1% of its GDP).
Several different options exist for addressing congestion in cities. One of the most common
policies has been to expand highway capacity. At times when politicians intend to foster economic
growth, the increase in investment in road transportation has an important impact as a counter-
cyclical fiscal policy (Leduc and Wilson, 2017). However, one of the main criticisms levelled at the
expansion of an intrametropolitan highway network is that this policy may not generate any real
improvements in accessibility and in economic growth; the evidence shows that, in the long term,
these investments may simply relocate economic activity and leave congestion levels unchanged
(Duranton et al., 2020).
One of the reasons for the inability of these policies to reduce urban congestion is the induced
demand effect, also known as the ‘fundamental law of highways congestion’ (Downs, 1962, 1992).
As a result of the new demand induced by the added road capacity, the travel speed (as a measure
of congestion) on an expanded highway reverts to its level prior to its expansion. The induced
demand phenomenon has undergone extensive empirical testing; however, the evidence is not
conclusive for either short-run or long-run analyses (for an overview, see Hymel, 2019). Many
of the earlier studies lack a good identification strategy for explaining the causal links between
the increase in highway capacity and its impact on vehicle traffic. Interesting exceptions are the
papers by Duranton and Turner (2011) and Hsu and Zhang (2014), which show an elasticity of
traffic with respect to highway lane miles of approximately one for both US and Japanese urban
areas. A unit elasticity suggests that increasing capacity supply does not reduce traffic congestion,
not even partially.
It is not clear that the same induced demand effect also holds for the cities in Europe. These
cities are more compact than most US cities, and they are also characterized by a lower degree of
car-dependency and the widespread use of public transportation2. While EU Regional and Co-
hesion Funds have funded a considerable portion of the immense highway network development
1Taking into account the commute delay attributable to congestion delay, the 10 most congested cities in the world
in 2019 were Bogotá, Rio de Janeiro, Mexico City, Istanbul, Sao Paulo, Rome, Paris, London, Boston and Chicago
(INRIX, 2019).
2According to OECD data, the average urban population density in the European metropolitan areas in 2011 was
718 persons per km2, compared to only 282 in the US. OECD and Eurostat statistics indicate for the same year that car
use in Europe was some 42% lower than in the US. Also Europe is the world’s leader in public transit systems: two
thirds of the large European cities have subways compared with only a third in the US (Gonzalez-Navarro and Turner,
2018).
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in the last few decades, to our knowledge, there are no integrated studies analysing the impact
of highway expansion on traffic congestion in the cities of Europe as a whole.
In this paper we test the ’fundamental law of highway congestion’ for 545 metropolitan areas
of the EU28 countries during the period 1985—2005. This analysis for the whole of Europe is
methodologically challenging because we need to overcome several identification issues in order
to properly estimate the causal effect. The first contribution of this paper is that we combine
GIS data for a variety of historical data of transportation networks in Europe in order to obtain
unbiased estimates. A second contribution is that we break down the effect of the highway
expansion to the capacity effect (number of lanes) and the coverage effect (length of the network).
Finally, our third contribution is that we are able to study the heterogeneity of the effects based
on the existence of other policies that target congestion in European cities. To see whether these
policies affect congestion, we first control for the road pricing policies, and then take into account
the availability of public transportation (railroads and subways) connecting some city centers with
their suburbs. Our average results indicate that, in line with the evidence from the US and Japan,
for the European cities the induced demand effect is clear for both the capacity and coverage
expansion. However, we found that the induced demand is considerable smaller in cities with
road pricing schemes, and that congestion falls with public transportation expansions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we begin by describing our
data on congestion and highways in European cities and how we process them. Then in Section
3, we discuss our estimation approach and in Section 4 we present the results. To take account of
some of the specific features of European cities, in Section 5 we include congestion pricing and
the availability of public transportation in European cities in the analysis. Finally, we present the
main conclusions in Section 6.
2. Congestion and highways in Europe
We use the Functional Urban Area (FUA) (formerly known as Larger Urban Zone (LUZ)), defined
by the European Commission (Urban Audit Project) and the OECD as the unit of observation. In
common with the Metropolitan Statistical Area in the US, the FUA consists of a central city (with
at least 50,000 inhabitants) and a commuting zone (made up of all municipalities with at least 15%
of their employed residents working in the city. The final dataset includes 545 FUAs covering the
whole geography of Europe (29 countries)3.
2.1 Congestion in Europe
We use data from the Road Traffic Censuses conducted by the United Nations Economic Com-
mission for Europe (UNECE). These censuses contain traffic and inventory information on the
main highways in Europe (E-Road network) at a very detailed geographical level (road segments)
for every five years from 1985 to 20054. Specifically, we obtain information on the annual average
3
34 cities have not been considered in the final sample due to the lack of congestion data.
4Unfortunately, more recent censuses for 2010 and 2015 do not cover all European countries, only some of them.
2
daily traffic (AADT), the length (km) and the number of lanes of each segment for the years 1985,
1995 and 2005.
To measure traffic congestion, we use the well-known indicator ’vehicle kilometers traveled’
(VKT), that is, the kilometers traveled by motor vehicles on the highway network. We first
compute its value at the segment level by multiplying the length of each highway segment (km)
with its AADT. Then, we compute the VKT at the FUA level by summing the values for all
highway segments located within each FUA.
Table 1 reports the computations of these indicators for our sample of 545 European cities:
Average values for both AADT and VKT, and individual VKT values for the top 10 and the bottom
10 cities with population over 1 million inhabitants. Regarding the AADT, an average European
city in 2005 had 15,900 vehicles passing any point of the highway network. Between 1985 and
2005, the number of vehicles increased by 70%. The high standard deviations in parenthesis
indicate that the FUAs are quite different and heterogeneous in terms of AADT. Figures 1a and
1b show that the increase of the AADT was a general feature in all Europe.
Table 1: Highway congestion in European cities, 1985–2005
1985 1995 2005 1985–1995 1995–2005 1985–2005
Annual average daily traffic (vehicles) - FUA 15,900 21,358 27,020 34.3% 26.5% 69.9%
(15,318) (19,237) (21,837)
Vehicle kilometers traveled (’000 km) - FUA 2,673 3,603 4,586 34.8% 27.2% 71.6%
(3,959) (4,722) (5,426)
VKT for the top 10 FUAs with population over 1 million (’000 km)
London (UK) 57,435 62,633 66,830 9.1% 6.7% 16.4%
Madrid (ES) 21,754 20,737 39,644 -4.7% 91.2% 82.2%
Ruhrgebiet (DE) 20,326 28,405 29,964 39.7% 5.5% 47.4%
Frankfurt (DE) 24,217 27,500 28,810 13.6% 4.8% 19.0%
West Midlands (UK) 25,282 25,578 28,608 1.2% 11.8% 13.2%
Berlin (DE) 13,610 20,425 24,930 50.1% 22.0% 83.1%
München (DE) 18,386 19,747 23,111 7.4% 17.0% 25.7%
Amsterdam (NL) 10,969 22,204 22,304 102% 0.5% 103 %
Hamburg (DE) 17,212 22,548 22,169 31.0% -1.7% 28.8%
Manchester (UK) 16,368 19,421 21,231 18.7% 9.3% 29.7%
VKT for the bottom 10 FUAs population over 1 million (’000 km)
Leipzig (DE) 4,632 5,849 6.954 26.3% 18.9% 50.1%
Napoli (IT) 3,526 5,877 5,798 66.7% -1.3% 64.5%
Torino (IT) 1,774 5,272 5,289 197% 0.3% 198%
Porto (PT) 1,081 3,443 5,125 218% 48.8% 374%
Sofia (BG) 2,745 3,495 5,039 27.3% 44.2% 83.6%
Ostrava (CZ) 902 1,227 3,825 36.0% 212% 324%
Krakow (PL) 1,732 2,127 3,753 22.8% 76.5% 117%
Katowice (PL) 1,012 1,856 3,708 83.5% 99.8% 267%
Gdansk (PL) 1,419 1,591 2,806 12.1% 76.4% 97.7%
Bucuresti (RO) 738 1,051 2,135 42.5% 103% 189%
Notes: FUA’s values are averages. Standard deviations in parenthesis.
VKT figures in Table 1 and Figures 1c and 1d also show high levels of traffic on highways
and a growth between 1985 and 2005. On average, motor vehicles traveled 2.7 and 4.6 million
km in 1985 and 2005, respectively. The standard deviations in parenthesis indicate that the traffic
levels were quite different between cities. Focusing on the most populated cities, the top 10 cities
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had VKT values above the 20 million km. Their traffic grew with rates ranging from 13% in
West Midlands (UK) to 103% in Amsterdam (NL). The cities with lowest VKT had values in 2005
between 2 million km (Bucuresti, RO) and almost 7 million km (Leipzig, DE). All these cities
experienced significant increases in their traffic levels, between 50% (Leipzig, DE) and more than
300% (Ostrava, CZ; Porto, PT).
Figure 1: Highway congestion in Europe
(a) 1985 AADT (b) 2005 AADT
(c) 1985 VKT (d) 2005 VKT
Table 2: Highways in European cities, 1985–2005
1985 1995 2005 1985–1995 1995–2005 1985–2005
Total length (km) - Europe 28,196 52,077 74,219 84.7% 74.2% 163%
Total length (km) - FUA 14,747 23,070 35,328 56.4% 53.1% 140%
Average length (km) - FUA 127 139 184 9.4% 32.3% 44.9%
(106) (107) (146)
Average number of lanes - FUA 1.6 1.9 2.1 18.7% 10.5% 31%
(0.9) (1.0) (1.2)
Average Lane kilometers - FUA 1,666 1,762 1,884 5.8% 6.9% 13.1%
(1,441) (1,501) (1,575)
Notes: Standard deviations in parenthesis.
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Figure 2: Highways in Europe
(a) Evolution of the highway network, 1985-2005 (b) 2005 Highway length
(c) 2005 Highway lanes (d) 2005 Highway lane kilometers
(e) 2005 Highway tolls
2.2 Highways in Europe
To measure the size of the highway network, we compute the so-called ’lane kilometers’. First, we
multiply the length (km) of each highway segment with the number of lanes. Then, we sum the
resulting values for segments located within each city. As above mentioned, the UNECE Road
Traffic Censuses also provide information on segment length and lanes.
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Table 2 presents the main characteristics of the highway network in 1985, 1995 and 2005 in
Europe and in our sample of 545 cities. Of the more than 74,000 km of European highways in
2005, almost half of them were located in FUAs. Between 1985 and 2005, the network more than
doubled. Figure 2a shows the evolution of the highway network in Europe between 1985 and
2005.
Table 2 also reports average computations for the 545 FUAs and shows that highways were
extended both in terms of their coverage and their capacity. First, the length of the highway
network of an average FUA increased from 127 to 184 km (a 45%) between 1985 and 2005. Second,
the average number of lanes also increased from 1.6 to 2.1 in 20 years. As a result, the number of
lane kilometers of the average FUA increased from 1,666 in 1985 to 1,884 km in 2005. The high
standard deviations of these three variables (in parenthesis) and their related maps in Figures 2b,
2c and 2d indicate that the European cities show a high degree of heterogeneity.
Figure 2e shows a categorization of the share of tolled highway kilometers in the 545 FUAs. In
2005
5, an average city had a 25% of tolled highways. However, our sample includes cities without
tolls (285) and with tolls (260). Among the latter, 77 cities have tolls in all their highways.
According to Albalate and Bel (2012), tolls in Europe are mostly used to finance construction
and maintenance costs of highways and, as a result, they are not related to traffic congestion.
However, more recently some cities have adopted congestion pricing policies -the so-called urban
tolls- in order to reduce the impact of traffic (congestion, noise and pollution). Figure 2e shows the
14 cities that, according to https://www.urbanaccessregulations.eu, apply ’congestion prices’
in 2020.
3. Empirical strategy
3.1 Pool, panel and first-difference
In this section, we introduce the empirical framework used to estimate the effect of the highway
network expansion on the level of congestion. Increasing the supply of highways is expected
to lower the cost of motor vehicle use in the short run because of the increase in the overall
highway capacity in a city, which decreases traffic congestion. However, this reduction in the
major component of the cost of motor vehicle use might affect the travel decisions of individuals
regarding the mode and quantity of travel. The ’fundamental law of highway congestion’ suggests
that the long term average effect of increasing the supply of roads will be that induced demand
will bring the level of congestion back to its initial level (or even to a higher level).
To empirically study the role played by highways improvements on highway congestion, we
index cities by i and years by t, and estimate the following equation:
ln(VKTit) = β0 + β1 × ln(Lane kmit)
+ β2 × ln(Populationit) + β3 × Socioeconomyit
+ β4 ×Geographyi + β5 ×Historyi + εit
(1)
5Unfortunately, only the 2005 UNECE Road Traffic Census provide this kind of information at the highway segment
level.
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where VKTit refers to the vehicle kilometers traveled and measures the kilometers traveled by
motor vehicles in the highway network. The main explanatory variable is Lane kmit and refers to
the number of highway lane kilometers. Populationit is the number of inhabitants from official
population censuses provided by the DG REGIO of the European Commission. Socioeconomyit is
a vector of characteristics including income, proxied by GDP; unemployment rate; and industrial
composition, proxied by the shares of employment in manufacturing, in financial and business
services, and in non-market services. Since there are no data available at the FUA level, all three
variables are computed using data from the NUTS3 in which the FUA is located. Geographyi
includes controls for physical geography such as total land area (km2); a suburbanization index,
which is the share of the central city area; the altitude (meters), elevation range (meters), and the
terrain ruggedness index computed a la Riley et al. (1999) using the Digital Elevation Model over
Europe (EU-DEM)6; and the logarithm of the distance (m) to the closest coast from the centroid of
the central city. Finally, Historyi adds two types of historical controls. First, dummy variables for
historical major cities in 814, 1000, 1200, 1450 and 18507. Second, three controls for more recent
history (the 20th century): The logarithms of the decennial levels of population between 1960 and
1980.
With data describing a panel of cities, we can partition εit into permanent (δi) and time-varying
(ηit) components. By so doing, we can remove all time-invariant city effects by estimating
Equation (1) using city fixed-effects (Equation (2)) or its first-difference version (Equation (3)):
ln(VKTit) = β1 × ln(Lane kmit)
+ β2 × ln(Populationit) + β3 × Socioeconomyit + δi + ηit
(2)
∆ln(VKTit) = β1 × ∆ln(Lane kmit)
+ β2 × ∆ln(Populationit) + β3 × ∆Socioeconomyit + ∆ηit
(3)
where ∆ is the first-difference operator.
3.2 Instrumental variables
When the random element of traffic congestion is uncorrelated with highways, we can estimate
Equations (1), (2) and (3) by ordinary least squares (OLS). However, highway lane kilometers are
expected to be endogenous to vehicle kilometers traveled because of reverse causation (e.g., con-
gestion fostering highway expansion), measurement error (e.g., highways mismeasured because
some may have just opened or are about to be opened) and omitted variables (e.g., geography,
amenities or economic structure leading to more highways).
To address concerns of endogeneity, we rely on IV estimations (limited-information maximum
likelihood, LIML). We use the digital vector maps created or used by Garcia-López (2019) to
built instruments based on the ancient road and railroads in Europe: The main and secondary
roads during the Roman Empire (McCormick et al., 2013), the main trade routes in the Holy
6The original GIS raster maps are available in https://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/data/
copernicus-land-monitoring-service-eu-dem.
7These dummies are computed using information from the Digital Atlas of Roman and Medieval Civilizations
(DARMC, http://darmc.harvard.edu) and from Bairoch et al. (1988).
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Roman Empire in the 15th century (Ciolek, 2005), the postal roads in 1810 according to A.
Arrowsmith’s map8, and the railroad network in 1870 (Marti-Henneberg, 2013). Figures A.1
and A.2 in Appendix A.1 shows their location in Europe and Barcelona, respectively.
Since, by definition, these historical instruments are time-invariant, we follow Baum-Snow
(2007) and Garcia-López (2012, 2019) and adopt a ’shift-share’ approach a la Bartik (1991) using
each historical (rail)road as the ’share’ component and the evolution of the highway network
as the ’shift’ component. Specifically, we compute each time-variant historical instrument by
multiplying its historical length (in km) by the fraction of the highway network kilometrage
in each country completed at each year and excluding each city’s own contribution.
As common sense suggests, historical transportation networks may be relevant because mod-
ern networks are not built in isolation from them. On the contrary, it is easier and cheaper to build
new infrastructures close to old infrastructures. Duranton and Turner (2011, 2012), Garcia-López
(2012) or Garcia-López et al. (2015), among others, show that the stocks of historical (rail)roads are
indeed highly correlated with the stocks of modern transportation networks in the US, Barcelona
and Spain, respectively.
We econometrically test the relevance of each time-variant historical (rail)road in Appendix
A.2. Specifically, Table A.1 shows OLS results when we regress the highway lane kilometers on
the length of each ancient (rail)road (km) following a pooled strategy (columns 1 to 3, Equation
(A.1)) and panel fixed-effect strategy (columns 4 and 5, Equation (A.2)). We also follow a first-
difference strategy regressing the changes in the highway lane kilometers on changes in the length
of each ancient (rail)road (km) (columns 6 and 7, Equation (A.3)), and adding the lag of VKT
while controlling for geography, history and country fixed-effects (columns 8 and 9) or for FUA
fixed-effects (columns 10 and 11). According to Murray (2006), valid instruments should have
significant effects on modern highway lane kilometers and high First-Stage F-statistics. First-stage
results show that both Roman roads and the 1870 railroads predict the congestion level when we
follow a pooled regression strategy (columns 1 and 2). However, when we use a panel fixed-effect
and first-difference regressions (columns 4, 6, 8 and 10), only the Roman roads predict both the
levels and the changes in the highway lane kilometers. Results also show First-Stage F-statistics
are near or above Stock and Yogo (2005)’s critical values, in particular when only Roman roads
are used as instrument.
Our time-variant historical instrument also needs to be exogenous. As Garcia-López (2019)
explains in detail, its ’shift’ element is exogenous because, by construction, it refers to the length
of the highway network that would have existed in each year had governments allocated highway
construction uniformly across Roman roads within the countries. The ’share’ component, the
length of Roman roads, may also be exogenous because Roman roads were not built to anticipate
the current traffic congestion levels in European cities. On the contrary, they were built to achieve
military, administrative, and commercial goals between different parts of the Roman Empire
(Garcia-López et al., 2015, Garcia-López, 2019). However, since geography and history have
influenced both the evolution of European cities and its transportation networks, the exogeneity
of the Roman instrument hinges on controlling for those characteristics as in the pooled regression
8See the David Rumsey Map Collection (http://www.davidrumsey.com) for the original paper maps.
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strategy (Equation (1)). Alternatively, we can add city fixed-effects as in Equation (2) or estimate
a first-difference regression as in Equation (3).
4. Does the fundamental law of highway congestion apply in Europe?
4.1 Main results
The fundamental law of highway congestion has been confirmed in the US (Duranton and Turner,
2011) and Japan (Hsu and Zhang, 2014). In this section, we investigate whether this (more than)
proportional increase in congestion levels when highways are expanded also applies in Europe.
Table 3 reports OLS and LIML results in columns 1 to 5 and 6 to 7, respectively, when we
regress the log of vehicle kilometers traveled on the log of highway lane kilometers. In columns
1 and 6, we follow a pooled strategy and estimate Equation (1) without control variables. In
columns 2 and 7, we add all control variables. Columns 3 to 5 and 8 to 10 show results when we
follow a fixed panel strategy and estimate Equation (2) gradually adding time-variant explanatory
variables: the log of lane kilometers in columns 3 and 8, the log of population in columns 4 and
9, and socioeconomic controls in columns 5 and 10. Table 3 also reports first-stage statistics for
the LIML regressions (which use the log of the time-variant length of Roman roads as instrument),
and all of them are near or above Stock and Yogo (2005)’s critical values.
Table 3: The effect of highways on traffic congestion, OLS and IV results
Dependent variable: ln(VKT)
OLS results IV results
Pool Panel Pool Panel
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
ln(Lane km) 0.969a 0.831a 0.689a 0.686a 0.695a 1.480a 1.558a 1.256a 1.285a 1.206a
(0.026) (0.034) (0.096) (0.097) (0.097) (0.150) (0.272) (0.304) (0.337) (0.314)
ln(Population) X X X X X X
Geography X X
History X X
Socioeconomy X X X X
Country fixed-effects X X
FUA fixed-effects X X X X X X
Year fixed-effects X X X X X X X X X X
Adjusted R2 0.80 0.89 0.70 0.70 0.71
First-Stage F-statistic 29.51 12.01 21.12 19.90 19.79
Instrument ln(Km of Roman r.) ln(Km of Roman roads)
Notes: 1,635 observations (545 cities × 3 decades (1985-2005)) in each regression. Geography controls include the logarithm of the
FUA area, a suburbanization index, which is the share of the central city area, the mean and range of FUA elevation, the mean
surface ruggedness for each FUA and the logarithm of the distance to the closest coast from the central city centroid. History
includes the logarithms of FUA population in 1960, 1970 and 1980, and dummy variables for historical major cities in 814, 1000,
1200, 1450 and 1850. Socioeconomic characteristics are the log of the GDP, the share of employment in manufacturing, the share
of employment in finance and business services, the share of employment in non-market services, and the unemployment rate.
Robust standard errors are clustered by FUA and are in parenthesis. a, b and c indicates significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent level,
respectively.
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The estimated OLS coefficient of interest is positive and significantly different from zero in
all specifications and shows that a 1% increase in the log of lane kilometers increases the vehicle
kilometers traveled between 0.7 (column 5) and 0.8% (column 2). After addressing concerns
of endogeneity, LIML counterparts in columns 7 to 10 show a higher impact of highways on
congestion between 1.2 and 1.6%, respectively.
Appendix B provides additional results following a pooled strategy. In Table B.1, we estimate
Equation (1) for each year: 1985, 1995 and 2005. OLS and LIML results are between 0.8-0.9 and
1.3-1.8, respectively, and are not statistically different from their counterparts in Table 3. In Table
B.2, we show that the estimated coefficient of interest is quite stable when we gradually add
explanatory variables to the pooled regression.
We also perform a set of robustness checks in Table C.1 of Appendix C. First, to address
endogeneity concerns about the population variable (Duranton and Turner, 2011), in Panel A we
follow the pooled strategy and estimate Equation (1) instrumenting the population variable with
two time-invariant instruments: the average temperature and the average precipitation of the
FUA. In column 1 we only instrument population, in column 2 we simultaneously instrument the
two endogenous variables. In both cases, the the associated First-Stage statistics are above and
close to the Stock and Yogo (2005)’s critical values, respectively. Furthermore, the OLS and LIML
results are in line with those in columns 2 and 7 of Table 3.
Second, we are worried that some country specific shocks may have affected both the evolution
of highways and congestion at the country level. To allow the countries to have different time
trends, in Panel B we follow the panel fixed-effect strategy and estimate Equation (2) adding
country-specific linear trends in columns 3 and 4. Both OLS and LIML results hold.
Third, another potential concern is that the increase in highway traffic and the highway
development are both affected by the supply of other roads that are not classified as highways9.
In Panel C, we estimate Equation (2) adding the length of secondary roads and the length of
local roads as explanatory variables. Since these two additional variables are also endogenous,
we instrument them in column 6 using the time-variant lengths of the 15th c. trade routes during
the Holy Roman Empire and of the 1810 post routes10. The related First-Stage F-statistic is near
the Stock and Yogo (2005)’s critical value. Results for the lane kilometers are not statistically
different from those in columns 2 and 7 of Table 3. Interestingly, the expansion of secondary
roads decreases highway congestion, but the effect is quite small (0.02-0.03).
Finally, we also test for the functional form of the effect under study. One might expect that the
effect of highway expansion on traffic congestion depends crucially on the extent of the highway
network in each city. In Panel D, we add the square of the log of lane kilometers. Results
show that this quadratic term is not statistically significant and its value is very close to zero.
Furthermore, the estimated coefficient for lane kilometers is in line with previous results.
Now we change our empirical strategy and follow the first-difference approach by estimating
Equation (3). Table 4 presents OLS and LIML results in columns 1 to 5 and 6 to 10, respectively.
9We use data of secondary and local roads provided by the EC DG-REGIO (for more details, see Stelder, 2016).
10We build these instruments using the ’shift-share’ approach explained in Section 3.2. The length of each historical
(rail)road is the ’share’ component and the evolution of the country transportation network (excluding each city’s own
contribution) is the ’shift’ component.
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Columns 1 to 3 and 6 to 8 show results when we gradually add time-variant explanatory variables:
Only the change in lane kilometers (columns 1 and 6), adding the change in population (columns
2 and 7) and including the changes in socioeconomic controls (columns 3 and 8). Since all time-
invariant factors drop out of Equation (3), we add geography, history and country dummies as
control variables in columns 4 and 9, and add FUA fixed-effects in columns 5 and 10. Moreover,
we also add the logarithm of the lagged vehicle kilometers traveled in columns 4-5 and 9-10. Table
4 also reports first-stage statistics for the LIML regressions (which use the log of the time-variant
change in the length of Roman roads as instrument), and all of them are above Stock and Yogo
(2005)’s critical values.
Results for the OLS regressions show elasticities of the change in lane kilometers ranging
between 0.2 in the most demanding specification (column 5) and 0.6 in the pure first-difference
specification (column 3). After instrumenting lane kilometers with the time-variant Roman road
instrument, LIML results for the different specifications are quite stable and show an elasticity
around 1.2%. Both OLS and LIML results are in line with those using pooled and panel fixed-
effect approaches in Table 3.
Table 4: The effect of highways on traffic congestion, OLS and IV results: First-difference
Dependent variable: ∆ln(VKT)
OLS results IV results
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
∆ln(Lane km) 0.632a 0.633a 0.638a 0.520a 0.243a 1.190a 1.177a 1.249a 1.104b 1.138a
(0.103) (0.103) (0.103) (0.092) (0.063) (0.328) (0.361) (0.375) (0.438) (0.306)
Lagged ln(VKT) -0.161a -1.057a -0.131a -0.874a
(0.020) (0.048) (0.039) (0.088)
∆ln(Population) X X X X X X X X
Geography X X
History X X
∆Socioeconomy X X X X X X
Country fixed-effects X X
FUA fixed-effects X X
Adjusted R2 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.41 0.80
First-Stage F-statistic 23.58 22.01 21.26 14.12 16.22
Instrument ∆ln(Km of Roman roads)
Notes: 1,090 observations (545 cities × 2 first-difference periods) in each regression. Geography controls include the logarithm of
the FUA area, a suburbanization index, which is the share of the central city area, the mean and range of FUA elevation, the mean
surface ruggedness for each FUA and the logarithm of the distance to the closest coast from the central city centroid. History
includes the logarithms of FUA population in 1960, 1970 and 1980, and dummy variables for historical major cities in 814, 1000,
1200, 1450 and 1850. Socioeconomic characteristics are the log of the GDP, the share of employment in manufacturing, the share
of employment in finance and business services, the share of employment in non-market services, and the unemployment rate.
Robust standard errors are clustered by FUA and are in parenthesis. a, b and c indicates significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent level,
respectively.
In summary, the fundamental law of highway congestion states that a capacity expansion
of highways produces a (more than) proportional increase in highway congestion levels. LIML
results when using pooled, panel and first-difference empirical strategies confirm that this law
also applies in European cities. Focusing in our preferred specification in column 10 of Table 3
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that follows a panel fixed-effect estimation, a 1% increase in the highway lane kilometers increases
the vehicle kilometers traveled by 1.2%. This elasticity is slightly higher than the one obtained by
Duranton and Turner (2011) for the US (1.02) and almost the same than the estimated by Hsu and
Zhang (2014) for Japan (1.24).
4.2 Coverage and capacity effects
A highway network can be extended by increasing the number of lanes, that is, its ’capacity’.
Another way is extending the length of existing routes or creating new ones, that is, increasing
the ’coverage’ of the highway network. After confirming that the fundamental law apply to
European cities, we now turn our attention to study whether the effect of an increase in highway
provision is related to a ’coverage effect’ and/or to a ’capacity effect’.
Based on previous main results, we depart from our preferred panel fixed-effect approach
to estimate an equation that consider both the length of the highway network and the average
number of highway lanes11:
ln(VKTit) = β1a × ln(Km of highwaysit)
+ β1b ×Average number of lanesit
+ β2 × ln(Populationit) + β3 × Socioeconomyit + δi + ηit
(4)
It is important to notice that these two variables are also endogenous and, as a result, need
to be instrumented. For the case of the length of highways, Garcia-López (2019) shows that
historical (rail)roads and, in particular, Roman roads, are good predictors of this variable. Table
A.2 of Appendix A.3 reports first-stage OLS results when we regress the log of km of highways
on the log of km of our time-variant historical (rail)roads conditional on controls. In column 1,
we separately include the four old (rail)roads and find that only Roman roads has a positive and
significant effect. In column 2, we only include the Roman roads and confirm its effect. In both
cases, the First-Stage F-Statistic is near Stock and Yogo (2005)’s thresholds.
As shown by Garcia-López (2012), Garcia-López et al. (2015) and Garcia-López et al. (2017a,b),
the location of modern highways is also related to the location of historical (rail)roads. In fact,
when mapping these old (rail)roads we realize that most of them are located very close to each
other (see, for example, the case of Barcelona in Figure A.2). This could mean that, conditional
on the geography, building additional lanes is easier and cheaper in those highway segments
where we also find more old (rail)roads in parallel. Based on this idea, we instrument the average
number of highways lanes with the average number of historical (rail)roads12. Column 3 of Table
A.2 shows first-stage results when we consider the average number of all historical (rail)roads. In
column 4, we separately consider the average number of each historical (rail)road. In both cases,
estimated coefficients are positive and significant. The related First-Stage F-Statistics are above
the Stock and Yogo (2005)’s thresholds.
11We consider the number of lanes in each highway segment and compute the average for each city.
12For each year and highway segment, we compute the number of historical (rail)roads that are located in parallel
less than 1 kilometer. Then, we compute the average for each city.
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Table 5 reports LIML results of estimating different specifications of Equation (4). First, we
separately consider the logarithm of the highway length (column 1) and the average number of
lanes (columns 2 and 4). Later, we jointly include both variables in columns 3 and 5. Since
both variables are expected to be endogenous, we instrument them with the above mentioned
instruments: The length of historicals (rail)roads (columns 1, 3 and 5), the average number of
all historical (rail)roads (columns 2 and 3), and the average number of each historical (rail)road
(columns 4 and 5). These LIML results show positive effects of extending highway routes and
increasing lanes. In particular, our preferred results in column 3 indicate that doubling the
highway network, either by increasing the highway length by 100% or by building one additional
lane in all highway segments, causes a 114% and a 212% growth in the vehicle kilometers traveled,
respectively. These elasticities confirm both the coverage and capacity effects, being the latter
more important.
Table 5: The effect of highways on traffic congestion, IV results: Length and lanes
Dependent variable: ln(VKT)
Instrumenting: Length Lanes Both Lanes Both
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
ln(Km of highways) 2.293a 1.146a 1.287a
(0.561) (0.288) (0.208)
Number of lanes 2.117a 2.198a 2.702a 2.540a
(0.493) (0.369) (0.513) (0.333)
ln(Population) X X X X X
Socioeconomy X X X X X
FUA fixed-effects X X X X X
Year fixed-effects X X X X X
First-Stage F-statistic 11.52 26.29 7.65 11.78 8.47
Instruments ln(Roman roads) ln(Roman roads) ln(Roman roads)
Number of all historical (rail)roads Numbers of each historical (rail)road
Notes: 1,635 observations (545 cities × 3 decades (1985-2005)) in each regression. Socioeconomic characteristics are the log of
the GDP, the share of employment in manufacturing, the share of employment in finance and business services, the share of
employment in non-market services, and the unemployment rate. Robust standard errors are clustered by FUA and are in
parenthesis. a, b and c indicates significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
5. Do tolls and public transportation matter?
Compared with US cities, there are at least two prominent features in European cities: The
use of tolls, and the massive investment in public transportation, in particular, in railroads. In
this section, we study whether these two characteristics affect the fundamental law of highway
congestion.
5.1 Tolls
As discussed in Section 2.2, in 2005 almost half of the cities included in our sample had tolls
(260 out of 545) and, on average, these tolls affected 25% of the highway network. To analyze the
role of these tolls, we depart from the panel fixed-effect approach to estimate an equation that
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includes the interaction of our main explanatory variable:
ln(VKTit) = β1 × ln(Lane kmit)
+ β2 × ln(Lane kmit)× Tollsi
+ β3 × ln(Populationit) + β4 × Socioeconomyit + δi + ηit
(5)
Table 6 show results for Equation (5). In column 1, we interact lane kilometers with a dummy
for cities with tolled highways. In column 2, the interaction variable is a dummy for cities with
25% or more of tolled highways. Finally, we directly interact lane kilometers with the share
of tolled highway segments in columns 3. Results are essentially identical and show that (1)
highway improvements increase congestion, (2) the effect is smaller in cities with tolls, and
(3) the fundamental law is mainly related to cities without tolls or with a low percentage of
tolled highways. In particular, and focusing on our preferred specification in column 3 (using a
continuous interaction), a 1% increase in lane kilometers increases congestion by 1.9% in cities
without tolls and by only 0.3% (=1.9-1.6) in cities with tolls in all their highways (100% share
of tolled highways). Some simple computations show that the fundamental law applies to cities
with a share of tolled highways below 56%. These results can be regarded as novel evidence
in line with recent literature suggesting that the solution to traffic congestion is the adoption of
’congestion’ pricing policies (Santos, 2004, de Palma et al., 2006, Winston and Langer, 2006, Leape,
2006, Eliasson and Mattsson, 2006).
Table 6: The effect of highways on traffic congestion, IV results: Tolls and interactions
Dependent var.: ln(VKT)
Interacting: All tolled cities Above 25% tolls cities Share of tolled highways
[1] [2] [3]
ln(Lane km) 1.903a 2.106a ln(Lane km) 1.894a
(0.560) (0.743) (0.629)
ln(Lane km) -1.203b -1.454b ln(Lane km) -1.598b
×Dummy tolls (0.527) (0.685) ×Share tolls (0.785)
ln(Population) X X ln(Population) X
Socioeconomy X X Socioeconomy X
FUA fixed-effects X X FUA fixed-effects X
Year fixed-effects X X Year fixed-effects X
First-Stage F-stat 11.18 7.62 First-Stage F-stat 4.50
Instruments ln(Km of Roman roads) ln(Km of Roman roads) Instruments ln(Km of Roman roads)
ln(Roman)×Tolls ln(Roman)×25% Tolls ln(Roman)×Share tolls
Notes: 1,635 observations (545 cities × 3 decades (1985-2005)) in each regression. Socioeconomic characteristics are the log of
the GDP, the share of employment in manufacturing, the share of employment in finance and business services, the share of
employment in non-market services, and the unemployment rate. Robust standard errors are clustered by FUA and are in
parenthesis. a, b and c indicates significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
We might fear that the allocation of highway tolls is endogenous to traffic. However, as
discussed in Section 2.2, tolls in Europe are mostly used to finance construction and maintenance
costs of highways (Albalate and Bel, 2012). Only recently some cities have adopted ’congestion’
pricing policies in order to reduce the impact of traffic (congestion, noise, pollution, ...). According
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to https://www.urbanaccessregulations.eu, only 14 of our 545 cities apply ’congestion prices’
in 2020. The above results hold when we do not include the observations related to these 14 cities.
Finally, in Appendix D we follow an alternative empirical strategy based on estimating Equa-
tion (2) for two subsamples: Cities with tolls vs. without tolls. Results reported in Table D.1
confirm that highway tolls mitigate the induced demand effect of highway expansions.
5.2 Public transportation
Now we turn our attention to public transportation and, in particular, the railroad network. In
Europe, it was mainly built during the 19th and 20th centuries and nowadays there are more
than 225,000 km of rail lines. At the FUA level, the network expanded from 32,000 to 52,000 km
between 1985 and 2005. On average, the network increased more than 60%, from 59 to 96 km.
Some examples of the more recent railroad expansion are the construction of the Regional Express
Rail (RER) network in Paris (Garcia-López et al., 2017a,b) or the introduction of the high-speed
rail in Germany (Ahlfeldt and Feddersen, 2018), Spain (Albalate et al., 2017) and the UK (Heblich
and Simpson, 2018).
We study the effect of railroads on congestion by estimating a version of Equation (2) which
includes the length of railroads as explanatory variable:
ln(VKTit) = β1 × ln(Lane kmit)
+ β2 × ln(Km of railroadsit)
+ β3 × ln(Populationit) + β4 × Socioeconomyit + δi + ηit
(6)
Since the stock of railroads may also depend on the level of highway congestion, now we have
to deal with an additional endogenous variable. To do so, we follow Garcia-López (2019), which
shows that the 1870 railroad network is a good predictor of the length of modern railroads. Table
A.3 of Appendix A.4 reports first-stage OLS results when we regress the log of km of railroads
on the log of km of our time-invariant historical (rail)roads conditional on controls. In column
1, we separately include the four old (rail)road networks and find that only the 1870 railroads
has a positive and significant effect. In column 2, we only include the 1870 railroad network
and confirm its effect. In both cases, the First-Stage F-Statistic is near Stock and Yogo (2005)’s
thresholds.
Column 1 of Table 7 reports LIML results when we estimate Equation (6). They confirm the
positive effect of lane kilometers on congestion and the fundamental law of highway congestion
with a VKT elasticity above 1. More interesting are the results for railroads: Their estimated coef-
ficient is significant and negative, indicating that railroads directly moderate highway congestion.
In particular, a 1% increase in the length of the railroad network decreases congestion by 0.5%.
Subways are important in the largest European cities because a high proportion of their
mobility is based on this transportation mode (Gonzalez-Navarro and Turner, 2018). In our
sample, 32 cities have a subway network within their cores and connecting with their suburbs.
The subway network of the average city had 52 km in 2011 and it represented around 14% of the
total railroad length. To study whether subways also matter for congestion, we estimate Equation
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(6) including the interaction13 between the railroad length and the share of subways. Column
2 shows LIML results when we only instrument lane km and railroad length. Our preferred
specification in column 3 reports LIML estimates when the interaction term is also instrumented.
In this case, results confirm (1) the fundamental law of highway congestion (with a VKT elasticity
above 1) and (2) the above mentioned negative effect of railroads on congestion. Furthermore,
the negative estimated coefficient for the interaction term shows that (3) the more important the
subways in the railroad network, the higher the reduction of congestion. In particular, a 1%
increase in the length of the railroad network decreases congestion by 0.6% in a city without
subways, by 0.8% in a city with the average share of subways (14%), and by 1.3% in a city where
subways are 50% of the total railroad network.
Table 7: The effect of highways on traffic congestion, IV results: Public transportation
Dependent variable: ln(VKT)
Interacting with the share of subways
[1] [2] [3]
ln(Lane km) 2.208a 1.408a 1.407a
(0.531) (0.324) (0.344)
ln(Km of railroads) -0.533b -0.488b -0.562b
(0.270) (0.240) (0.268)
ln(Km of railroads) -0.660c -1.384c
×Share of subways (0.393) (0.760)
ln(Population) X X X
Socioeconomy X X X
FUA fixed-effects X X X
Year fixed-effects X X X
Share of subways X X
First-Stage F-stat 4.98 3.31 2.12
Instruments ln(Km of Roman roads) ln(Km of Roman roads) ln(Km of Roman roads)
ln(Km of 1870 railroads) ln(Km of 1870 railroads) ln(Km of 1870 railroads)
ln(1870 Rail)×% Subways
Notes: 1,635 observations (545 cities × 3 decades (1985-2005)) in each regression. Socioeconomic characteristics are the log of
the GDP, the share of employment in manufacturing, the share of employment in finance and business services, the share of
employment in non-market services, and the unemployment rate. Robust standard errors are clustered by FUA and are in
parenthesis. a, b and c indicates significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
In summary, the above results point out that railroads serve to free up highway capacity by
taking drivers off the highways and putting them in trains. These findings are in contrast to those
of Duranton and Turner (2011), who find no effect of public transit on congestion. However, their
empirical evidence is based on regular buses, which are as prone to traffic congestion as motor
vehicles. On the contrary, our findings are in line with those of Anderson (2014), who finds that
public transit generates large congestion relief benefits.
13We use an empirical strategy based on an interaction term (instead of directly using the length of the subway
network as explanatory variable) because, unfortunately, we only have GIS maps and data for subways in 2011.
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6. Conclusions
In this paper, we provide evidence that the ’fundamental law of highway congestion’ holds for the
cities of Europe, but also that well designed public policies can moderate this congestion. We use
data for the 545 largest European cities to estimate the elasticity of a measure of congestion with
respect to highway expansion. The results indicate that this elasticity is in the range close to 1.
This suggests that expansion of the highway network induced the demand for car travel, and so,
on average, the level of congestion remained roughly unchanged in the period 1985–2005. In other
words, we show that investments in highways did not effectively relieve traffic congestion. We
also break down the type of expansion into coverage (the network length) and capacity (number
of lanes); we find that both effects were significant in explaining the increase in traffic especially
the capacity effect. Controlling further for road pricing and public transportation policies, our
results indicate that cities with these policies in place suffer less congestion.
These findings have major implications for transportation policies, given the persisting severity
of traffic congestion in European urban areas where the reduction of car use has became a priority.
Only a few cities have established congestion charges, and public transport systems are under
financial pressure. It is clear that there is great deal of scope for the design of good policies.
Related to our results, it is well known that public acceptance of road pricing schemes is very
low. People are not willing to pay in order to be able to drive and, on the other hand, the
evidence seems to show that this policy might be regressive. A good way to proceed would be to
introduce urban tolls and use the revenues obtained to improve public transportation.
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Appendix A. Historical roads and railroads in Europe
A.1 Maps
Figure A.1: Historical roads and railroads in Europe
Figure A.2: Historical roads and railroads in Barcelona
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A.2 First-stage results for highway lane kilometers
To econometrically test the relevance of each time-variant historical (rail)road, we estimate the
following first-stage equations and show their results in Table A.1:
ln(Lane kmit) = γ0 + γ1 × ln(Historical (rail)road kmit)
+ γ2 × ln(Populationit) + γ3 × Socioeconomyit
+ γ4 ×Geographyi + γ5 ×Historyi + εit
(A.1)
when we follow a pooled regression approach (Equation (1)). Results are in columns 1 to 3.
ln(Lane kmit) = γ1 × ln(Historical (rail)road kmit)
+ γ2 × ln(Populationit) + γ3 × Socioeconomyit + δi + ηit
(A.2)
when we follow a panel fixed-effect approach (Equation (2)). Results are in columns 4 and 5.
∆ln(Lane kmit) = γ1 × ∆ln(Historical (rail)road kmit)
+ γ2 × ∆ln(Populationit) + γ3 × ∆Socioeconomyit + ∆ηit
(A.3)
when we follow a first-difference approach (Equation (3)). Results are in columns 6 to 11.
Table A.1: Historical (rail)roads and modern highway lane kilometers, OLS results: First-stage
Dependent variable: ln(Lane km) ∆ln(Lane km)
Pool Panel First-Difference
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11]
ln(Roman roads) 0.026a 0.025a 0.025a 0.037a 0.038a ∆ln(Roman roads) 0.034a 0.034a 0.028a 0.028a 0.034a 0.034a
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
ln(15th c. trade routes) 0.002
(0.007)
ln(1810 post routes) 0.011
(0.008)
ln(1870 railroads) 0.029a 0.027a 0.008 ∆ln(1870 railroads) 0.006 0.002 0.011
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011)
ln(Population) X X X X X ∆ln(Population) X X X X X X
Socioeconomy X X X X X ∆Socioeconomy X X X X X X
Geography X X X Geography X X
History X X X History X X
Country fixed-effects X X X Country fixed-effects X X
FUA fixed-effects X X FUA fixed-effects X X
Lagged ln(VKT) X X X X
Year fixed-effects X X X X X Year fixed-effects X X X X X X
First-Stage F-Statistic 5.22 10.36 12.01 10.55 19.79 First-Stage F-Statistic 11.13 21.26 7.92 14.12 8.44 16.22
Notes: 1,635 observations (545 cities × 3 decades (1985-2005)) in pooled and panel regressions (columns 1 to 5) and 1,090
observations (545 cities × 2 periods) in first-difference regressions (Columns 6 to 11). Geography controls include by the logarithm
of the FUA area, a suburbanization index, which is the share of the central city area, the mean and range of FUA elevation, the
mean surface ruggedness for each FUA and the logarithm of the distance to the closest coast from the central city centroid. History
includes the logarithms of FUA population in 1960, 1970 and 1980, and dummy variables for historical major cities in 814, 1000,
1200, 1450 and 1850. Socioeconomic characteristics are the log of the GDP, the share of employment in manufacturing, the share
of employment in finance and business services, the share of employment in non-market services, and the unemployment rate.
Robust standard errors are clustered by FUA and are in parenthesis. a, b and c indicates significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent level,
respectively.
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A.3 First-stage results for highway length and number of lanes
Table A.2: Historical (rail)roads and modern highway length and lanes, OLS results: First-stage
Dependent variable: ln(Km of highways) Number of lanes
[1] [2] [3] [4]
ln(Km of Roman roads) 0.043a 0.050a Number of all historical (rail)roads 0.119a
(0.015) (0.015) (0.023)
ln(Km of 15th c. trade routes) -0.017b Number of Roman roads 0.183a
(0.007) (0.040)
ln(Km of 1810 post routes) 0.011 Number of 15th c. trade routes 0.174a
(0.010) (0.046)
ln(Km of 1870 railroads) 0.010 Number of 1810 post routes 0.097b
(0.010) (0.049)
Number of 1870 railroads 0.157a
(0.046)
ln(Population) X X ln(Population) X X
Socioeconomy X X Socioeconomy X X
FUA fixed-effects X X FUA fixed-effects X X
Year fixed-effects X X Year fixed-effects X X
First-Stage F-Statistic 5.15 11.52 First-Stage F-Statistic 26.29 11.78
Notes: 1,635 observations (545 cities × 3 decades (1985-2005)) in each regression. Socioeconomic characteristics are the log of
the GDP, the share of employment in manufacturing, the share of employment in finance and business services, the share of
employment in non-market services, and the unemployment rate. Robust standard errors are clustered by FUA and are in
parenthesis. a, b and c indicates significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
A.4 First-stage results for modern railroads
Table A.3: Historical (rail)roads and modern railroads, OLS results: First-stage
Dependent variable: ln(Kilometers of railroads)
[1] [2]
ln(Kilometers of Roman roads) -0.019
(0.012)
ln(Kilometers of 15th c. trade routes) 0.006
(0.013)
ln(Kilometers of 1810 post routes) 0.011
(0.020)




FUA fixed-effects X X
Year fixed-effects X X
First-Stage F-statistic 5.75 17.41
Notes: 1,635 observations (545 cities × 3 decades (1985-2005)) in each regression. Socioeconomic characteristics are the log of
the GDP, the share of employment in manufacturing, the share of employment in finance and business services, the share of
employment in non-market services, and the unemployment rate. Robust standard errors are clustered by FUA and are in
parenthesis. a, b and c indicates significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
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Appendix B. Additional results
Table B.1: The effect of highways on traffic congestion, OLS and IV results: Years
Dependent variable: ln(VKT)
OLS results IV Results
1985 1995 2005 1985 1995 2005
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
ln(Lane km) 0.904a 0.813a 0.768a 1.832a 1.310a 1.844a
(0.043) (0.039) (0.040) (0.342) (0.225) (0.264)
Population X X X X X X
Geography X X X X X X
History X X X X X X
Socioeconomy X X X X X X
Country fixed-effects X X X X X X
Adjusted R2 0.88 0.90 0.88
First-Stage F-statistic 11.92 11.89 14.11
Instrument ln(Km of Roman roads)
Notes: 545 observations in each regression. Geography controls include the logarithm of the FUA area, a suburbanization index,
which is the share of the central city area, the mean and range of FUA elevation, the mean surface ruggedness for each FUA and the
logarithm of the distance to the closest coast from the central city centroid. History includes the logarithms of FUA population
in 1960, 1970 and 1980, and dummy variables for historical major cities in 814, 1000, 1200, 1450 and 1850. Socioeconomic
characteristics are the log of the GDP, the share of employment in manufacturing, the share of employment in finance and
business services, the share of employment in non-market services, and the unemployment rate. Robust standard errors are
clustered by FUA and are in parenthesis. a, b and c indicates significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
Table B.2: The effect of highways on traffic congestion, OLS and IV results: Gradual
Dependent variable: ln(VKT)
OLS results IV Results
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
ln(Lane km) 0.969a 0.752a 0.896a 0.882a 0.831a 1.480a 1.617a 1.519a 1.529a 1.558a
(0.026) (0.031) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.150) (0.313) (0.233) (0.256) (0.272)
Population X X X X X X X X
Geography X X X X X X
History X X X X
Socioeconomy X X
Country fixed-effects X X
Adjusted R2 0.797 0.830 0.852 0.855 0.887
First-Stage F-statistic 29.51 13.04 15.89 12.82 12.01
Instrument ln(Km of Roman roads)
Notes: 1,635 observations (545 cities × 3 decades (1985-2005)) in each regression. Geography controls include the logarithm of the
FUA area, a suburbanization index, which is the share of the central city area, the mean and range of FUA elevation, the mean
surface ruggedness for each FUA and the logarithm of the distance to the closest coast from the central city centroid. History
includes the logarithms of FUA population in 1960, 1970 and 1980, and dummy variables for historical major cities in 814, 1000,
1200, 1450 and 1850. Socioeconomic characteristics are the log of the GDP, the share of employment in manufacturing, the share
of employment in finance and business services, the share of employment in non-market services, and the unemployment rate.
Robust standard errors are clustered by FUA and are in parenthesis. a, b and c indicates significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent level,
respectively.
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Appendix D. An alternative approach to analyze the role of tolls
As an alternative, but also complementary approach to the one developed in Section 5.1 to analyze
the role of tolls, we consider an empirical strategy based on subsamples. Specifically, in Table D.1
we split our sample of cities and run separate regressions. First, in columns 1 and 2 we compare
cities without tolls (285) with cities with tolls (260). Second, in columns 3 and 4 we compare cities
with less than 25% of tolled highways (343) with cities with 25% or more of tolled highways (202).
All LIML results point out in the same direction: The effect of lane kilometers on VKT is higher
in cities without tolls or with less than 25% of tolled highways than in cities with tolls or with
more than 25% of tolled highways. Furthermore, LIML results show that the fundamental law is
only related to cities without tolls or with less than 25% of tolled highways, with elasticities of
1.13 and 1.34, respectively. As a whole, these results confirm the ones obtained using an empirical
strategy based on interactions (Section 5.1).
Table D.1: The effect of highways on traffic congestion, IV results: Tolls and subsamples
Dependent variable: ln(VKT)
Without vs. With tolls Below vs. Above 25% tolled highways
without with below above
[1] [2] [3] [4]
ln(Lane km) 1.132c 0.856a 1.335b 0.589c
(0.680) (0.328) (0.529) (0.328)
ln(Population) X X X X
Socioeconomy X X X X
FUA fixed-effects X X X X
Year fixed-effects X X X X
Observations 855 780 1029 606
FUA 285 260 343 202
First-Stage F-statistic 4.82 11.16 7.72 9.44
Instrument ln(Km of Roman roads) ln(Km of Roman roads) ln(Km of Roman roads) ln(Km of Roman roads)
Notes: Socioeconomic characteristics are the log of the GDP, the share of employment in manufacturing, the share of employment
in finance and business services, the share of employment in non-market services, and the unemployment rate. Robust standard
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